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charts were made, how the skills to make them were learned, and how charts can 
be related to the expanding worlds of commerce and power. Unlike mappae- 
mundi, Portolan charts functioned within concrete social and economic condi- 
tions in which accuracy mattered. In a brilliant and fascinating section, Campbell 
shows how place names on charts can be studied to date them. Toponymy was a 
major feature of Portolan charts; small charts did not, as a rule, have fewer 
names than large ones, and toponymic content was revised continuously. Other 
aspects of accuracy studied by Campbell include projection, the role of the com- 
pass, and units of measurement. Because Campbell has studied Portolan charts 
so thoroughly, he has realized the need for a stylistic index of common and 
distinguishing characteristics of them. His chapter also ends with a list of charts, 
which has references to readily available illustrations in print. 
By comparison with the chapters on mappaemundi and Portolan charts, Har- 
vey's chapter on local and regional plans is short. But such maps were in fact 
relatively unimportant in medieval life, Harvey explains, because written texts 
predominated over graphic representations in descriptions of property divisions, 
travelers' routes, and the like. Clearly, the lack of such maps does not indicate 
that medieval people were uninterested in space, but rather that they could meet 
their needs to understand space on this level without maps. What maps existed 
lacked scale; they functioned as pictorial displays, with oblique or perspective 
views. How can the emergence of scale maps and of maps with accurate geo- 
graphical outlines be explained, asks Harvey, and what have such maps to do 
with a medieval interest in scientific geography? 
In their conclusion to Volume I, Woodward and Harley reemphasize the role 
of social forces. The evolution of maps, they argue, "can be made sense of as a 
historical process only when seen as part of the totality of a society's knowledge 
and when that knowledge is also seen as a manifestation of a socially constructed 
world" (p. 506). As they carry the history of cartography forward, we will learn 
much not only about maps, but about how and why and with what consequences 
civilizations have apprehended, expanded, and utilized the potential of maps. 
Few scholars are ever privileged to participate in a venture that promises to 
transform an entire field of knowledge. The world of scholarship is indebted to 
Brian Harley, David Woodward, and their collaborators in The History of Car- 
tography. 
JOSEF W. KONVITZ 
Department of History 
Michigan State University 
East Lansing, Michigan 48824 
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Historians have long looked to the social sciences for help in making sense of the 
past. And with good reason. Social scientists have devised concepts and ap- 
proaches that have proved invaluable for historical inquiry. Social science poses 
new questions. It frees historians from the partisanship of contemporaries and 
the conventions of historiography. 
Even more important, the social sciences provide historians with organizing 
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themes. Historians have traditionally been long on data and short on ideas. Yet 
in recent decades this familiar situation has been enormously aggravated. The 
computer, microfilm, and the Xerox machine have dramatically expanded histo- 
rians' ability to process information. But just what one does with all this infor- 
mation is by no means clear. Confronted with reams of printouts and bulging 
filing cabinets, historians have borrowed from the social sciences the plot lines 
and dramatic scaffolding they need to make sense of their data. 
James R. Beniger's The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Ori- 
gins of the Information Society is in this distinguished social science tradition. 
Beniger, a sociologist at the Annenberg School of Communications at the Uni- 
versity of Southern California, has written a book that is bold, even audacious. 
He seeks nothing less than to reconceptualize the history of the modern era and 
the language of the social sciences in terms of information processing, control, 
and communications. 
Beniger begins with a pair of related questions. Why has information come to 
dominate the world's largest and most advanced economies? And why has it 
"only recently emerged as a distinct and critical commodity" (p. vi)? 
His answer is the "Control Revolution." Using the United States as his test 
case, he posits a late nineteenth-century revolution in the organization of the 
economy, based on the establishment of bureaucratic structures in business and 
government. This revolution resolved the "crisis in control" caused by the un- 
precedented speeding up of material processing made possible by steam power. 
Beniger dates the American Industrial Revolution from this crisis, which he 
identifies with the construction of a railroad network in the 1840s (p. 207).1 For 
both revolutions, speed is the central parameter (pp. 175, 207). 
Bureaucracy resolved the crisis by restoring, albeit with "increasing centraliza- 
tion," the economic and political control that had been lost at more local levels of 
society during the Industrial Revolution (p. 7). It did so by harnessing speed. 
Bureaucracy, in short, is a technology, defined not "in the narrow sense of prac- 
tical or applied science but in the more general sense of any intentional extension 
of a natural process" (p. 9).2 It is, in fact, "the most important control technol- 
ogy" to emerge before the coming of the computer (p. 6). Control-that is, "pur- 
posive influence toward a predetermined goal"-can be augmented either by in- 
creasing an institution's capacity to process information or by decreasing the 
amount of information to be processed. Bureaucracy, computers, and, most re- 
cently, microprocessors do the former (p. 7). Preprocessors do the latter-de- 
stroying or ignoring information "in order to facilitate its processing" (p. 15). 
The transformation of the material economy is but one consequence of the 
Control Revolution. It has also had a "pervasive" impact on cultural and intellec- 
1 Beniger's identification of the Industrial Revolution with the coming of the railroad is clearly 
indebted to Alfred Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Busi- 
ness (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1977). Yet it is worth noting that the identification is 
Beniger's and not Chandler's; "industrial revolution" (lowercased) appears but once in The Visible 
Hand's index, referring to developments in eighteenth-century Great Britain. Thomas Cochran, in 
contrast, contends in Frontiers of Change: Early Industrialism in America (New York: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1981), that the "revolutionary phase" of American industrialism ended by 1825 (p. 78). Brooke 
Hindle and Steven Lubar reach a similar conclusion in Engines of Change: The American Industrial 
Revolution, 1790-1860 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986), pp. 23-26. To con- 
fuse matters further, Robert Wiebe puts the "industrial revolution" (lowercased) after the Civil War 
in The Opening of American Society: From the Adoption of the Constitution to the Eve of Disunion 
(New York: Knopf, 1984), p. 252. Little wonder that Gordon Wood was moved to remark, in his 1987 
presidential address before the Society for Historians of the Early American Republic, that the con- 
cept had lost its utility and should be dropped from the historians' lexicon. 
2 Even the brain itself qualifies as a human technology, since it "probably developed in interaction 
with purposive tool use" (p. 9). 
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tual life (p. vi). For natural scientists, it helped to "reconceptualize traditional 
subjects like cellular biology" (p. 57). For social scientists, it created the very 
language to which "we . .. may hope to reduce our proliferating but still largely 
unsystematic knowledge of social structure and process." Information process- 
ing, control, and communications are central to "all aspects of human society 
and social behavior" (p. 436). Yet before the Control Revolution this insight 
would have been impossible: "Most of the conceptual apparatus we need to 
understand the Control Revolution . .. was directly inspired by the Control Rev- 
olution itself.... The new ideas followed major technological advances.... 
This means that, although our interest here lies primarily in understanding the 
Control Revolution, we can also chronicle its impact on the history of ideas.... 
For those who consider intellectual history to have a material basis, we could 
hardly do otherwise" (p. 39). 
Beniger is at his best when he describes how new forms of energy transformed 
the nineteenth-century American economy. He draws imaginatively on the rele- 
vant secondary literature, though curiously Thomas Cochran's Frontiers of 
Change and Robert Wiebe's Search for Order are missing from the bibliography. 
And while Thomas Hughes's Networks of Power is in the bibliography, his con- 
cept of "reverse salients," which invites comparison with Beniger's "crisis of 
control," goes unmentioned in the text. In contrast, the enormous debt Beniger 
owes Alfred D. Chandler's compelling analysis of the making of the modern 
corporation is evident on virtually every page. Large stretches of The Control 
Revolution, in fact, can be read as a sympathetic gloss, from the perspective of 
information theory, on The Visible Hand.3 
Beniger's analysis is not without its problems. He is quite right to stress the 
importance of the eighteenth-century commercial revolution that preceded the 
railroad, but slights its cultural preconditions and its close relationship with the 
emergence of the nation-state.4 Even more surprising, given Beniger's theme, is 
his cursory treatment of the invention of printing. Elizabeth Eisenstein's Printing 
3 Cochran, Frontiers of Change (cit. n. 1); Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 
(New York: Hill & Wang, 1967); Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western 
Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1983); and Chandler, Visible Hand (cit. 
n. 1). 
4 For recent discussions of these developments see Cochran, Frontiers of Change; and Hindle and 
Lubar, Engines of Change (cit. n. 1). 
This content downloaded from 160.39.45.170 on Thu, 18 Jun 2015 20:15:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
678 ESSAY REVIEWS-ISIS, 79: 4: 299 (1988) 
Press as an Agent of Change provides the sociologist with a wealth of insight 
into the critical "control revolution" that ushered in the modern era, but Beniger 
chooses not to follow her lead.5 
On a more mundane level, specialists will inevitably find much to quarrel with. 
To cite but one example, Beniger's discussion of the coevolution of the railroad 
and the telegraph oversimplifies a complicated story and is simply wrong for the 
period before 1850 (pp. 17, 230). Likewise, the various lists he uses to schematize 
his argument include various factual errors and questionable assumptions. Yet 
Beniger has not set out to write a monograph, and he should hardly be faulted for 
making occasional misstatements on a topic that historians have so notoriously 
neglected. Caveat emptor. 
More troubling is Beniger's opening section. Here he sets out to demonstrate 
the centrality of information processing, control, and communications to the ori- 
gins of life, as well as to all of human history prior to the mid eighteenth century. 
In a manner reminiscent of those celebrated general education courses that ear- 
nestly aspire to cram everything you would ever want to know about anything 
into twelve short weeks, Beniger takes his reader on a whirlwind tour of planet 
Earth, beginning with the amoeba, including an appendix on "What is Life? An 
Information Perspective." Even the most provincial of historians of the modern 
period may find this foreshortening a bit unsettling. Does the commercial revolu- 
tion deserve the same space (approximately a hundred pages) as all previous 
history, prehistory, and human evolution put together? Is this not technological 
determinism with a vengeance? 
Beniger would no doubt find these questions somewhat beside the point. As he 
is quick to point out, the full importance of information in contemporary society 
cannot be understood by any exercise of the historical imagination: "History 
alone cannot explain why it is information that increasingly plays the crucial role 
in economy and society" (p. vi). "Historical detail can only obscure the more 
fundamental laws that govern energy conversion and material processing" (p. 
31). "Here, then, is the most fundamental reason why the Control Revolution has 
been so profound in its impact on human society: it transformed no less than the 
essential life function itself.... We would have to go back at least to the emer- 
gence of the vertebrate brain if not to the first replicating molecules-marking the 
origin of life on earth-to find a leap in the capability to process information 
comparable to the Control Revolution" (p. 36). Heady stuff indeed. But not much 
use to historians preoccupied with less cosmic concerns. 
Yet Beniger does provide historians a clue as to how his work might be assimi- 
lated. The clue is the concept of "telenomy," which he borrows from the biolo- 
gists Colin Pittendrigh, Julian Huxley, and Ernst Mayr. As Beniger explains, 
telenomic processes are goal-directed but not teleological. That is, they owe their 
direction not to some future outcome but to a prior program. This program, in 
turn, must exist in "a physical form, thereby eliminating vitalist and other meta- 
physical baggage" (pp. 40-41). 
Modern historians, and even some twentieth-century specialists, have often 
neglected these processes. Yet they are eminently recoverable, embedded in 
sources ranging from organization charts and complex algorithms to congressio- 
nal debates over the federal budget. Only by ferreting them out will historians be 
able to understand the large-scale institutions that have become such prominent 
s Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cul- 
tural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe, 2 vols. (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979). 
See also Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Methuen, 
1982). Beniger also neglects the work of the great Canadian economic historian Harold Innis, an 
omission that is especially curious given their shared preoccupation with the material basis of infor- 
mation technologies; see esp. Innis, Bias of Communication (Toronto: Univ. Toronto Press, 1951). 
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actors in the contemporary world. For this insight alone, The Control Revolution 
makes a major contribution to the "organizational" approach to the American 
past.6 
Much more problematic is Beniger's effort to recast the social sciences as a 
branch of information theory. This seems unlikely. As Daniel Bell has brilliantly 
argued in Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, society is not a system.7 
Changes in the realms of culture and politics do not necessarily follow, or even 
parallel, changes in the technoeconomic realm. Did the Control Revolution spur 
the reconceptualization of cellular biology? Perhaps. But even the most dogmatic 
of externalists would be quick to add qualifications that Beniger's theory fails to 
supply. 
The limitations of Beniger's theory are highlighted by his treatment of popular 
fears regarding technology: "To understand the basis of human society in infor- 
mation processing, communication, and control . .. is to appreciate the profound 
irony in popular sentiment against technology that has persisted over the past 
century.... No human technology has more in common with all living things 
than do our various capabilities to process information, whether they be institu- 
tionalized in the formal structures and procedures of bureaucracy, input elec- 
tronically to computer memory, or photolithographed into the silicon wafers of 
microprocessors" (pp. 59-60). But are these fears really so surprising, given the 
cultural traditions that inform modern American sensibilities? And in an age 
haunted by the specter of nuclear war and environmental catastrophe, are they 
unnatural? 
Even more serious is the theory's silence with respect to the politics of con- 
trol. The Control Revolution, unlike the Managerial Revolution or the Industrial 
Revolution, does not lend itself to prosopography. To put the matter bluntly, 
precisely who is doing what to whom? The Industrial Revolution gave us indus- 
trialists; the Managerial Revolution managers. To whom do we owe the Control 
Revolution? Controllers? To trace its genealogy to the amoeba begs every inter- 
esting historical question.8 For this reason alone, it seems improbable that Con- 
trol Revolution will be finding its way into history textbooks as an organizing 
theme. The issues are unquestionably important, and Beniger asks the right ques- 
tions, but for adequate answers we must await a more sensitive discussion of the 
cultural and political dimensions of the information age. 
RICHARD R. JOHN, JR. 
History and Literature 
Harvard University 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 
6 For a recent assessment of the "organizational synthesis" see Louis Galambos, "Technology, 
Political Economy, and Professionalization: Central Themes of the Organizational Synthesis," Busi- 
ness History Review, 1983, 57:471-493. For a useful critique see Alan Brinkley, "Writing the History 
of Contemporary America: Dilemmas and Challenges," Daedalus, 1984, 113:132-134. 
7 Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic, 1976); and Bell, The 
Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic, 1976). 
8 Bell, Post-Industrial Society, pp. 269-298, 341-367. 
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